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Cybercrime is a topic in which 
public and governmental 
understandings have long 
been shaped by cultural 
constructions and the almost 
theatrical politics of security. 
In recent years, however, the 
Cybercrime stakes have risen 
with more professional and 
state engineered attacks, 
more commercial cybercrime 
and it being used to spread 
hate. As a consequence, 
Cybercrime has risen up the political agenda and it has 
come to be taken much more seriously. Our societal 
responses to it are now framed by Governmental Cyber-
security strategies and policies, yet a simple reading of the 
situation suggests that we still have some way to go to 
improve our understanding of the actual problem. 
What this interesting report by Claire Hargreaves and Dan 
Prince tells us is that (in the 20 years or so since I first 
started writing about Cybercrime) we have come a long 
way towards developing a real understanding of it, but 
there is some way to go. What I think is particularly useful 
about the report is the interdisciplinarity across the 
sciences and social sciences that Claire and Dan bring to it 
and also their emphasis upon the need to focus now upon 
the victims and offenders. It usefully sends some simple 
messages to the reader: we need to fully understand the 
role of technologies and not just make knee jerk reactions; 
we also need to develop standard protocols for data and 
also agree on mechanisms for the capture of that data; 
finally, there is a need to develop a more sophisticated 
knowledge and understanding of offenders and their 
victims, especially the latter who, all too often, are simply 
seen as a spurious data point which hides their agony. 
Foreword 
Prof David S Wall 
Professor of Criminology and 
Head of the School of Applied 
Social Sciences. Durham 
University 
  Executive Summary | i 
 
Executive Summary  
The report on the future of understanding cyber criminals and 
measuring their activity is created to detail the key findings from our 
workshop which addressed the actions required to tackle the 
perceived cybercrime wave.  
Cybercrime is increasingly seen as a significant criminal activity by governments around the 
world, whether they are purely digital crimes or traditional crimes which are enhanced 
through the use of digital technology. Despite the anecdotally growing trend and the 
significant investment by governments to tackle the issues there are few publically available 
sources of evidence on cyber criminals. We argue that in order to be effective in tackling 
cybercrime a strong evidence base is required. 
This report draws upon the discussions held in the workshop on defining a cybercrime and 
understanding the role by which the use of technology enables the criminal. We propose a 
classification assessment to differentiate between the two fundamental categories of 
cybercrime: computer enabled and computer dependent crime. We move on to explore the 
current state of information held, offering a data source taxonomy to facilitate the 
understanding of these datasets and identify the prominent features to aid data selection. 
During the workshop it was identified that in order to move forward in our research on 
cybercrime, an effort to standardise data must come into effect. The theoretical suggestions 
raised in this area are discussed along with how the information can facilitate research. 
Furthermore we detail the key points of contact at which valuable data can be collected 
along with current and advanced mechanisms by which information could be obtained. 
Following the accumulation of data and its increased quality heightened research can begin. 
We therefore converse proposed research on both cybercriminals and their victims. 
The key findings from the workshop are outlined below. 
Understand technologies role in cybercrime 
We draw upon the existing literature and the discussion held during the workshop in order 
to define, for the purpose of this paper, a cybercrime, and to understand the role by which 
the use of technology enables the criminal and mediates the victim offender interaction.  
Defining cybercrime was found to be a difficult task for several reasons, firstly cybercrime 
encompasses a broad spectrum of offences many of which can be traced back to traditional 
crimes, the question is then raised as to whether new definitions and laws are needed or 
whether amendments to existing legislation is all that is required. Cybercrime is a relatively 
new crime, in which government agencies, law enforcement bodies, businesses and 
academics have deliberated over in an effort to come to an overarching definition. 
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Dependent upon the organisation defining the crime some discrepancies exist, however 
there are two fundamental categories, computer enabled and computer dependent crime. 
Computer enabled crime is a traditional crime facilitated by technology whilst computer 
dependent crime is a crime which could not exist without new technology. 
With the broad categories of computer enabled and computer dependent crime it is 
important to develop mechanisms to be able to judge the extent to which either should be 
selected. The workshop discussed utilising the following concepts: 
• Force Amplification: A simple analogy here is that of physical harm with or without 
the use of a weapon. The level of harm that the average person can achieve with a 
weapon is far greater than that without. Similarly the amount of harm that can be 
caused with digital technology can be greatly amplified, for example, consider fraud 
via spam. If a fraudster had to send a letter to each target then the number of 
targets would be greatly diminished. The use of digital technology and 
communications enables the criminal to be able to interact with potential victims on 
a global basis. 
• Entry Barrier: A significant feature of all technology is that it significantly reduces the 
entry barrier for people to commit a criminal activity, consider copyright theft. In this 
instance, the digital replication of any copyright protected information, music, film, 
literature, is relatively trivial given the currently available technology. 
By utilising these two comparative properties crimes involving digital equipment may be 
compared for equivalency but also classification as computer enabled or computer 
dependent. This has a potentially significant advantage for the legal system in two respects. 
Firstly it presents the impact that technology played in the crime via a mechanism that does 
not rely on technical details that a lay person would find difficult to comprehend. Secondly it 
facilitates a comparative approach for prosecution and sentencing decisions which are again 
technology agnostic. This is an important principle that should be considered going forward, 
Focus on the impact of the technology not on the technology itself.  
Standardise data to further our data sources 
Cybercrime data is currently fragmented, this can be put down to a lack of data collection 
and also reoccurring arguments over the definition of what a cybercrime actually is. 
However, there are data sources available that can be used to help to understand the 
domain. The workshop sought to be surgical in its analysis of the available data sources to 
understand what is available and how this information may start to be combined to develop 
a complete and realistic understanding of the cybercriminal terrain. What became apparent 
in the workshop was the need for a step change in research on both cyber criminals and 
their victims and a more sophisticated understanding of what data is actually required to 
underpin appropriate analysis. 
To facilitate the comprehension of these data sets we propose a classification approach that 
identifies the salient features of the datasets, aiding researchers to select appropriate 
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sources for their investigation. The proposed data taxonomy comprises five levels: 
originator, type, collection methodology, processing methodology and data availability. At 
the first level, originator, the researcher establishes whether the data is public or private 
whilst at the second level, type, the quantitative and qualitative levels are assessed. The 
scope of the target population is evaluated at the third level, collection methodology, and 
how the information has been developed should be calculated at the process methodology 
level (fourth level).  At the final level, data availability, the level of access to the data should 
be considered. 
Whilst the exploration of current data has its benefits, it is limited. To move forward in this 
space it was debated that the production and provision of a standardised data frame was 
needed to develop reliable and valid datasets. Delegates identified several elements 
mandatory in the construction of standardised cybercrime data: the data must be kept 
simple, wells structured, have high input standards, consistent measurements and 
definitions, and inclusion of basic variables. Introducing these measures will limit, at the 
inputting stage, mistakes such as inconsistencies and duplications. What’s more, the 
datasets will be comparable optimizing sample size. Following the discussion on 
standardised data delegates debated its operationalization. It became apparent that in 
order for organisations to provide and maintain information, ownership of such data was 
key. It was suggested a structured data frame be provided to organisations in conjunction 
with adequate training.  
Although the proposed standardised data will provide stepping stones to fill the knowledge 
gap, it is not without its limitations. The data will only provide a snap shot of what is 
occurring in the UK. Furthermore, there will be extreme difficulties in standardising data 
particularly when the needs of academic, government and private sectors must all be met. 
Utilise mechanisms to capture data 
Utilising both new and old mechanisms of data capture will develop our evidence base. The 
workshop set out to explore mechanisms that could be utilised to capture data on 
cybercriminal activity. We propose there are two vehicles of data collection that can be 
adapted in order to capture appropriate data. The first of these is the key points of contact 
through the process of criminal investigation, prosecution and sentencing. The second 
opportunity is periodic or asynchronous crime or impact surveys carried out by 
governments and businesses. Victims and offenders interact with the investigative and 
legislative system from the first moment a crime is reported. These interactions provide 
ideal opportunities to gather information regarding the involvement of technology and 
therefore are able to classify it as a cybercrime. This approach of, little but often, enables a 
mass of information to be collated as the criminal justice system process progresses, rather 
than in an asynchronous survey approach. 
Surveys present a platform from which offenders can express their feelings, attitudes, 
motives and actions without fear of judicial repercussions. This method of data collection 
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also allows victims the opportunity to talk about crimes committed against them away from 
the pressures of law enforcement; victims may not feel it appropriate to report to the police 
or do not wish clients to know they have fallen victim to cybercrime. Furthermore, three 
advanced collection methods were identified: cyber specials who would be trained in both 
interview and cyber technology, online forums to gather more personal data and 
technologists who would have the ability to ascertain how equipment has been used – for 
better or for worse.  
Broaden analysis on cyber criminals and their victims 
Developing an understanding of who criminals and victims are in terms of their 
characteristics will help deliver appropriate interventions. Two fundamental areas were 
identified in the workshop as requiring extensive research: analysis of cyber criminals and 
investigation of victim profiles. Research on cybercrime data is minimal in comparison to the 
extensive analysis of traditional crime, the critical reason being the limitations of existing 
data. Research and its subsequent results are restricted to the quality of its data therefore 
advancements in cybercrime data must first be made.  
Research into why individuals commit crime when others do not, and to ascertain how 
these individuals are different to law abiding citizens is essential if we are to tackle cyber 
criminality. Through the use of statistical techniques factors associated to cybercriminals 
can be identified allowing us to answer such questions as, do cyber criminals have common 
demographic characteristics? Furthermore, comparing the characteristics of online to offline 
offenders will help to establish whether these groups of offenders are different. The results 
of such analysis will assist in shaping policy in terms of detection, intervention and 
punishment. In addition, the development of criminal career research on cybercrime data 
will enhance the evidence base used by policy makers and law enforcers. 
Establishing whether victims of cybercrime are a specific group of people will help to target 
preventative methods and resources. Through a victim information database researchers 
can investigate the characteristics of the victims to develop our understanding of who they 
are and determine if specific groups of people are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks and if so 
the reasons why. Following this information the common characteristics of the victims can 
be identified. For example, it may become apparent that the majority of victims were of the 
age 25 to 30, if this is the case preventative methods, such as educating them on how to 
stay safe online, could be targeted to this age group. 
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Introduction  
Cybercrime is increasingly seen as a significant criminal activity by 
governments around the world, whether they are purely digital 
crimes or traditional crimes which are enhanced through the use of 
digital technology. Despite the anecdotally growing trend and the 
significant investment by governments to tackle the issues there are 
few publically available sources of evidence on cyber criminals. 
 We argue that in order to be effective in tackling the perceived cybercrime wave a strong 
evidence base is required. In response to this challenge a workshop was organised to 
explore the future of cybercriminal activity and how key stakeholders could contribute to 
the publically available data that should inform this evidence base. The workshop brought 
together experts in the field, including government agencies, legal practitioners (Pannone), 
and academics from multi-disciplinary areas (computer scientists, criminologists and 
statisticians). 
The structured day-long workshop was held to explore the current situation, widen the 
knowledge of cyber criminals and develop innovative approaches to obtain information on 
cyber criminals. Importantly it provided an open environment for the stakeholders, who 
would normally be on differing sides in the adversarial legal process, to hold a critical, 
informed debate on this topic. The workshop held the following key aims: 
• Understand what data already exists on cyber criminals 
• To determine what information on cyber criminals is needed to bring such 
individuals to justice and map their criminal careers 
• To explore innovative methods to capture data on cyber criminals  
• To discuss the issues of storing, controlling and accessibility of a created database 
This report details the key findings from that workshop that collectively the workshop 
participants feel could guide the policies on the response to measuring cybercriminal 
activity. 
The key findings were: 
1. Understand technologies role in cybercrime: We need to focus on the impact of 
technology not on the technology itself if we are to move forward in our 
understanding of cybercrime. 
2. Standardise data to further our data sources: Cybercrime data is currently 
fragmented, requiring standardisation to build its reliability and validity.  
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3. Utilise mechanisms to capture data: Utilising both new and old mechanisms of data 
capture will develop our information base. 
4. Broaden analysis on cyber criminals and their victims: Developing an understanding 
of who criminals and victims are in terms of their characteristics will help to deliver 
appropriate interventions.  
We proceed in this report by firstly drawing upon the discussions held in the workshop on 
defining a cybercrime and understanding the role by which the use of technology enables 
the criminal. Two fundamental categories of cybercrime exist, computer enabled crime and 
computer dependent crime, a classification assessment of these categories has been 
proposed. We move on to explore the current state of information held, offering a data 
source taxonomy to facilitate the comprehension of these datasets and identify the 
prominent features to aid data selection. Following on we discuss theoretically the 
standardisation of data to develop reliable and valid information to facilitate research. We 
later review the key points of contact at which valuable data can be collected along with 
current and advanced mechanisms by which information could be collected. We end the 
report by proposing further research on both cybercriminals and their victims to advance 
our understanding of cybercrime. 
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Defining the Concepts 
Cybercriminal activity has proven to be an elusive concept to define. 
This section draws upon the existing literature and the discussions 
held during the workshop in order to define, for the purposes of this 
paper, a cybercrime, and to understand the role by which the use of 
technology enables the criminal and mediates the victim offender 
interaction. 
In his 2007/10 article, David Wall provides an approach which identifies three generations of 
cybercriminal activity: 
• Crimes in the machine (computer content) 
• Crimes using machines (computer related) 
• Crimes against the machine (computer integrity) 
Wall also goes further to identify a future where the offender victim interaction is 
automated by technology completely removing the need for victim selection and 
interaction. While this classification is useful in understanding the development and 
evolution of criminal activity as mediated by technology, the approach commonly used is to 
define computer crime as enabled (arguably the first two generations as described by Wall) 
and dependent. Further distinctions are also used, such as ‘using technology for 
communication and organisation purposes of a crime’, i.e. communicating online to 
undertake people trafficking. We use this as a starting point for the creation of definitions in 
the remainder of this report. 
A Cyber Criminal 
Important in the understanding of what it means to be a cybercriminal is the methodology 
by which we classify the crime as “cyber”. Digital technology and mass communication 
networks have created new opportunities to commit crime and for criminals to interact with 
their victims. Cybercrime is a relatively new crime, in which government agencies, law 
enforcements, businesses and academics have deliberated over in an effort to come to an 
overarching definition. Dependent upon the organisation defining the crime some 
discrepancies exist, however there are two fundamental categories: 
Computer enabled crime: traditional crime that is increased in its scale or reach 
through the use of technology. For example, phishing which attempts to acquire 
details (i.e. bank details) through email by purporting to be from a legitimate 
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organisation as opposed to an individual  eluding to be the gas man  to retrieve bank 
details. 
Computer dependent crime: crime which could not exist without new technology. 
For example, harvesting bank account details through malware. 
However, it is not clear by which metrics criminal activity is assessed in order to move it into 
these categories. For example, should the use of a computer to maintain a spread sheet of 
victim details involved in fraud be considered computer enabled? Arguably not as this 
information could be maintained in a paper format and the use of technology is to provide 
convenience to the criminal but any information gathered from the computer would be 
considered digital evidence. The important point here is that all computer crime has digital 
evidence, but not all digital evidence is part of a computer crime. 
As part of the workshop, delegates were given the task of defining cybercrime. What 
became apparent from the discussion was the difficulty in defining such a new and ever 
developing crime. The problem of knowing a crime has been committed is twofold; firstly 
individuals need to know an act is an offence and secondly have the knowledge and skills to 
detect a crime has been committed. Further discussion identified inconsistencies in the 
attitudes and approaches used in defining cyber criminality to those used in traditional 
crimes. Whereas in traditional crime harm and motivation are the driving factors, 
methodology is seen to be the principal factor in defining cybercrime. In addition, it was felt 
that more attention is to be given to educating society on the harm cybercrime causes. Of 
those who venture into the realm of cyber criminality some are often unaware they have 
crossed a line, others who know their actions are wrong do not always know  the level of 
harm they inflict.  
Conversely, the importance of defining cybercrime was questioned, as even the most 
obscure acts of cybercrime can be traced back to traditional crimes in some way or form. 
Nevertheless, it was deemed that there are unique offences which should be categorised as 
separate to the ones within the general criminal spectrum, such as the modification of 
computer material without authority to do so. 
To be classed as dependent or enabled a crime must have some unique features to it that 
involve the use of technology to move it beyond a traditional crime. The dependent 
classification has a clear delineation that it is only possible with the use of technology, for 
example illegally selling guns would not be a crime if gun technology did not exist. A 
significantly more difficult judgement is what causes a crime to be classified as enabled. 
Here an assessment of the impact the technology has on the commission of a crime and the 
way the offender/victim interaction is mediated is discussed. 
Impact of Technology  
With the broad categories of computer enabled and computer dependent crime it is 
important to develop mechanisms to be able to judge the extent to which either should be 
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selected. One such selection mechanism is the transformation or elimination test (Wall, 
2007), where the extent of the crime is assessed when technology mediation is removed 
from the criminal act or whether it could be substituted with other non-digital methods or 
approaches. This assessment goes someway to identify whether the use of digital 
technology in a crime should cause it to be identified as a cybercrime. However, we would 
argue that this presents a rather binary measure of the use of technology in the commission 
of a crime. As an alternative the workshop participants discussed whether an assessment of 
the impact that technology had on the commissioning of the crime rather than having a 
technologically detailed focus provides a more nuanced, graduated assessment process. 
Further, by having technologically independent assessment mechanisms would avoid having 
to repeatedly update classifications based on rapidly evolving technology. The workshop 
discussed utilising the following concepts: 
• Force Amplification: A simple analogy here is that of physical harm with or without 
the use of a weapon. The level of harm that the average person can achieve with a 
weapon is far greater than that without. Similarly the amount of harm that can be 
caused with digital technology can be greatly amplified, for example, consider fraud 
via spam. If a fraudster had to send a letter to each target then the number of 
targets would be greatly diminished. The use of digital technology and 
communications enables the criminal to be able to interact with potential victims on 
a global basis. 
• Entry Barrier: A significant feature of all technology is that it significantly reduces the 
entry barrier for people to commit a criminal activity, consider copyright theft. In this 
instance, the digital replication of any copyright protected information, music, film, 
literature, is relatively trivial given the currently available technology. 
By utilising these two comparative properties crimes involving digital equipment may be 
compared for equivalency but also classification as computer enabled or computer 
dependent. This has a potentially significant advantage for the legal system in two respects. 
Firstly it presents the impact that technology played in the crime via a mechanism that does 
not rely on technical details that a lay person would find difficult to comprehend. Secondly it 
facilitates a comparative approach for prosecution and sentencing decisions which are again 
technology agnostic. This is an important principle that should be considered going forward, 
Focus on the impact of the technology not on the technology itself.  
As the field of technology within the legal system is driven by technologies there is a natural 
tendency to focus on the details of the technology rather than the impact that it has on the 
facilitation of the crime. While there is certainly a need to obtain accurate details of 
technological use in commissioning a criminal activity in a forensically sound manner, it is 
vital not to lose sight of the impact this technology had on the criminal act. For example, a 
death threat can be sent by post or by email, if it is by email it should not make it a 
computer enabled crime. Given that this was only an initial exploration of qualifying the 
impact of technology on the criminal act, we do not claim that the criterion above is 
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completely appropriate. Further work needs to be completed in order to identify or validate 
appropriate criterion and a suitable, rigorous and repeatable methodology for classification 
against these criteria needs to be developed. However, the possibility of being technology 
agnostic in the assessment of technology in the criminal act as shown in Figure 1 is 
intriguing.  
 
Figure 1: Classification of computer enabled and computer dependent crime 
This begs the question of whether the use of technology to commit a crime should in fact be 
taken into account in the sentencing of a convicted criminal, in the same way the use of 
other types of technology, cars, weapons etc., are utilised in a criminal act may also impact 
sentencing. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of the workshop and this report. 
 
Summary 
Defining cybercrime was found to be a difficult task for several reasons, firstly cybercrime 
encompasses a broad spectrum of offences many of which can be traced back to traditional 
crimes, the question is then raised as to whether new definitions and legislations are 
needed or whether amendments to existing laws is all that is required. Secondly, in the 
various forms of cybercrime a technological skill set is often required thus a limited 
understanding of such skills widens the barrier to understanding cybercrime. A better 
understanding of the role by which the use of technology enables the criminal and mediates 
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motivation, in the current definition of cybercrime do not match those used in traditional 
crimes. Could rectifying this formula further the effectiveness of the criminal process and 
also aid society in its understanding of when a cybercrime has been committed and the 
implications of such acts?  
However, although there are issues in the clarity and understanding of cybercrime, the 
criminal justice system has still been able to prosecute these offenders (however small). The 
current definition of cybercrime has two fundamental categories: computer enabled and 
computer dependent. Is it then that supplementary guidelines or classifications on the 
impact of technology to establish if a crime is computer enabled or dependent, all that is 
needed?  
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Cybercrime Data 
The picture of cybercrime is currently fragmented and incomplete. 
This can be put down to a lack of data collection and also reoccurring 
arguments over the definition of what a cybercrime actually is. 
However, there are data sources available that can be used to help to 
understand the domain.  
The discourse surrounding these data provides a conflicting environment where public and 
private sector interests collide, media outlets generate hype in public opinion to create 
newsworthy stories and the potential of cyber-attacks is often misrepresented as fact. This 
environment has resulted in the UK government prioritising cyber security as a Tier 1 
national security threat (injecting £650M in cash support) and cybercrime remediation as a 
key component in its strategy to promote the UK in a digital economy. The workshop sought 
to be surgical in its analysis of the available data sources to understand what is available and 
how this information may start to be combined to develop a complete and realistic 
understanding of the cybercriminal terrain. What became apparent in the workshop was the 
need for a step change in research on both cyber criminals and their victims and a more 
sophisticated understanding of what data is actually required to underpin appropriate 
analysis. 
This section attempts to provide mechanisms to classify and evaluate the quality of available 
data. It will examine the advantages and disadvantages of existing data (i.e. inconsistent 
measurements, different definitions), which will be followed by a discussion of a 
standardised data set on cyber criminals and their victims in which criminal career and 
victim profiling can be implemented.  
Data Source Taxonomy 
Data sources are the lifeblood of understanding criminal activity, methodology and victim 
profiles. There are a range of data sources available for researchers to use from a variety of 
sources such as commercial (e.g. Internet service providers, third party payment 
authorisation companies and vendors) and government departments (e.g. National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau, Action Fraud and Crime Survey of England and Wales). However, the 
types of data source, the way it is presented and gathered all have a bearing on the 
usefulness of the data in developing an understanding of these areas. To facilitate the 
comprehension of these data sets we propose a classification approach that identifies the 
salient features of the datasets which will aid researchers to select appropriate sources for 
their investigation. 
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A fundamental data feature used for classification of sources is whether that data is 
qualitative or quantitative. In the context of data collection in computer incident reporting 
from sources such as Symantec, hard quantitative figures of malware infection are easy to 
collect from the devices that have the providers software installed. Similarly the financial 
impact of a criminal activity on a victim can be estimated and quantified. Quantitative data 
is useful in developing statistical numerical approaches to understanding criminal activity 
however it lacks the ability to capture important aspects of the criminal operation, 
motivation and impact. In this instance qualitative data enables richer datasets to be 
collected however, these data are more open to the subjective interpretation of the 
research in terms of reporting the results. In these instances a well-defined methodological 
approach to data capture and analysis is required to develop confidence in the produced 
dataset. 
Further differentiation can be found in the owner of the data source. Common sources of 
the data regarding the impact of cyber-attacks on the business community are collected by 
business groups themselves to explore specific populations. A further observation regarding 
these private sector reports is that they are also primarily technology orientated, focusing 
on the information that can be gathered from their services and products. Even surveys 
querying the community focus on the impact of technology use, consumption and violation. 
In contrast public data sources in this area have a crime focused approach, collecting details 
on the criminal act, the methodology and the outcome of the crime on the victim. It was 
also identified during the workshop that judicial reporting sources may often miss or mask a 
cyber component due to the precedent to focus on prosecuting crimes that would render 
the maximum impact on the suspect or has the most significant changes of success. A 
further accusation that has been levelled at private sector data sources is that they are 
typically structured in such a way as to provide confirmation bias in support of the business’ 
commercial position. This accusation is compounded as private sector reports are unlikely to 
be accompanied with the associated raw data sets and details of methodological 
approaches to collect and process the data resulting in a lack of transparency in the 
reported outcomes. Similar accusations can be levelled at public data in terms of support for 
the government of day, however, it is much more likely that public data is made available in 
its raw form to be verified by third parties. 
Another fundamental feature which defines the data is the method of data collection with a 
key aspect of this being the target population. The scope of the target population has a 
bearing on the range of responses collated. For example, some data sets often focus on key 
target groups such as business owners, technical personnel and so on, potentially limiting 
the range of responses. This is in contrast to assessments where great care is taken to 
obtain a representative group or where the data captured is from events beyond the control 
of the surveyor, for example the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) asks people 
aged 16 and over living in households in England and Wales about their experience of crime 
in the last 12 months. Information on both household and personal crime are obtained 
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through this survey. Beyond a discussion on the target population is the actual methodology 
used and the availability of information regarding the approach. Information regarding the 
approach used, double blind surveys, incentivised surveys, data gathering from computer 
programmes, all have a bearing on the reliability and confidence in the data. This is 
particularly important where novel methodologies are required to capture the data 
necessary to understand the unique features of cybercriminal activity. 
In addition to how the data is collected the availability of information on the processing 
methodology used is vital. This is of specific importance in the case of qualitative data sets 
and of other instances where there is a significant level of subjectivity in the interpretation 
of the data. For example, consider text based answers to the methods used by a 
cybercriminal. These data are clearly qualitative and therefore a subjective classification is 
needed in order to aggregate the data for reporting purposes. Here, having a rigorous, 
repeatable method for analysing data that can be performed by a third party and generates 
equivalent results is vital. While quantitative methods are more standard having a clear 
understanding of how the reported data were derived adds confidence to the quality of the 
reported interpretation and allows for repetition of analysis and verification of results. 
A final category that we feel should be considered is the level of access that is available to 
the data underpinning the research. A common practice, especially in the private sector, is 
to only publish the interpreted findings, i.e. the aggregated data. There are various 
motivations for this approach which are largely to do with data protection compliance. 
Anonymising such data, whether qualitative or quantitative, is complicated and an 
expensive task with potentially significant fines if identifying data is made available. 
However, the lack of raw data can undermine confidence in the published results as there is 
no way to verify the reported findings. The challenge of making this type of data available 
need to be overcome if we are to be able to look at third party sources, such as credit card 
companies, who may hold valuable information on cybercriminal activity. The problem is 
further compounded in the legal profession which could potentially hold a rich source of 
information on these types of crime, but would be bound by a stringent client-advocate 
confidentiality policy. The extreme alternative is to publish the full open data set for analysis 
by third parties, this openness should be coupled with information on the 
analysis/processing methodology in order to replicate the reported findings. 
A summary of these categories is given in Figure 2. For brevity and read ability, the complete 
taxonomical tree is not presented and it is assumed that each layer has a set of classification 
nodes connected to the parent.  
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Figure 2: Classification Taxonomy of data sources 
Blue print of cybercrime data 
Current data on both cyber criminals and their victims come in many shapes and sizes 
(discussed above), presenting difficulties in the collation and analysis of data. What became 
very apparent from the workshop was a need for the standardisation of cybercrime data. 
The workshop enabled informative discussion on the required improvements of constructed 
data and the framework needed to develop its reliability and validity. Here we discuss 
theoretically the creation and workings of standardised data. The discussion encompassed 
three elements: how data should be standardised, the operationalization of standardised 
data and the limitations of such constructed records. It was felt that each organisation 
(government, private sectors and academics) should run and maintain their own 
standardised data, increasing the collection of generic information with the addition of data 
specific to the organisation, which can be shared and analysed collectively. 
Delegates identified several elements mandatory in the construction of standardised 
cybercrime data. Primarily the data must be kept simple, well-structured with high input 
standards - an element lacking in many databases. The dataset should be structured clearly 
that enables easy navigation, for instance, the information each variable holds. If the data 
and usability is not simple mistakes are imminent as the clarity of use and navigation 
diminishes. Having incoherent variable names and vague instructions of what data is to be 
inputted leads to inconsistencies and duplicates within variables causing problems when 
searching data; limiting inputters’ discrepancies when keying data can reduce this problem. 
A method suggested is the use of drop down menus for selection.  For example, in a variable 
identifying the birth country of an offender, having no drop down menu may result in an 
inputter misspelling the country or writing the country with a capital letter the first time but 
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Furthermore, measurements and definitions must be clearly stated to ensure they remain 
consistent across datasets. For instance, datasets with varying definitions of cybercrime 
renders them incomparable. Moreover, individuals may be recorded multiple times under 
different aliases; the datasets must be able to manage multiple identities to ensure the 
same person is not counted more than once. The workshop identified a further key 
requirement of standardised data, the inclusion of several basic variables. Two reasons 
exist, one for comparability purposes and the other to obtain optimal sample sizes on both 
offenders and victims’ basic information. 
Following the discussion on standardised data delegates debated its operationalization. It 
became apparent that in order for organisations to provide and maintain information, 
ownership of such data was key. It was suggested a structured data frame be provided to 
organisations in conjunction with adequate training. The data frame would include 
mandatory variables for data collection plus the ability for owners to add additional factors. 
Due to the sensitivity of the data it was deemed compulsory to implement access rights 
dependent upon status (i.e. student, academic, private, public, government). Owing to the 
various organisations that may be undertaking operations or investigations based on the 
data held in such a system there exists a requirement for key information sets to be flag-
able, that is to be able to set public notification that other services are utilising the data, or 
to set private requests for notification when services review key data pertinent to their 
investigation. Such capabilities are intended to help prevent wasted manpower or impact 
between multiple, simultaneous investigations. It was believed that in order to capitalize on 
the standardised data both in terms of criminal justice and research, an umbrella search 
engine will be required. The search engine would process enquires on content contained 
throughout the datasets, feeding back the information whilst abiding by access rights. In 
addition, ownership information would be provided to assist request for access.      
Although the proposed standardised data will provide stepping stones to fill the knowledge 
gap, it is not without its limitations. The data will only provide a snap shot of what is 
occurring in the UK. Furthermore, there will be extreme difficulties in standardising data 
particularly when the needs of academic, government and private sectors must all be met. 
Summary 
The production of a five level data taxonomy, encompassing: originator, type, collection 
methodology, processing methodology and data availability, will provide researchers with 
the tools to classify and evaluate the quality of existing data. In doing so, investigators can 
select the appropriate sources for their investigation increasing the quality of results on 
which policy can be formulated. Without the mechanisms to identify the potential 
limitations of data, the risk of unaccounted bias increases greatly. However, to push forward 
in this space, new standardised data collections need to be implemented to develop reliable 
and valid datasets whilst facilitating optimal sample sizes and comparable datasets. 
Continued research on both existing data and the production of new standardised data will 
provide a clearer picture of cybercrime. 
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Mechanisms of Data Capture 
The workshop set out to explore mechanisms that could be utilised to 
capture data on cybercriminal activity using the types of innovative 
methods that digital technologies are capable of providing. However, 
the attendees quickly identified that a fundamental issue with current 
data collection approaches was that basic information, such as email 
addresses, were not being collected.  
This discussion broadened out into the key points of contact at which valuable, basic data 
could be collected and finally the mechanisms by which this basic information could be 
collected and how it could be extended to more advanced and nuanced data collection 
techniques. There are two significant barriers to the collection of information on 
cybercriminal activity. The first, and possibly the most significant barrier is the low threshold 
of the majority of cybercrime. The use of digital, mass communication technology enables 
the aggregation of numerous low level crimes that when aggregated comprise a significant 
overall prize to the criminal. As Wall notes, these crimes often fail to reach a threshold set 
by the investigative bodies or the victims that determines whether they are worth pursuing, 
which he describes as the de minimis trap (de minimis non curat lex: The Law does not 
concern itself with trifles). As a result the individual crimes go under reported. The second 
barrier is the distributed nature of attacks on such large numbers of victims making it very 
difficult to co-ordinate evidence gathering which would lead to aggregating cases together. 
This second barrier is further complicated by the difficulty of attribution of a digital crime to 
the offender as they have the ability to maintain and generate a plurality of identities and to 
attack victims from multiple international locations. These barriers present a unique 
problem for law enforcement as without accurate data collection accompanied by suitable 
correlation mechanisms on large scale organised1 cybercriminal activity, the investigative 
system may never become aware that a criminal activity has reached the de minimis 
assessment threshold. 
While fundamental to the investigative and enforcement process, the analysis of cybercrime 
also requires very similar data, statistical processes and correlation techniques to 
understand the cybercriminal activity in terms of offender motivation, offender actions, 
victim profile and criminal trends. We therefore propose there are two vehicles of data 
collection that can be adapted in order to capture appropriate data. The first of these is the 
key points of contact through the process of criminal investigation, prosecution and 
                                                     
1 By organised, we do not make reference to organised crime, but rather a wide spread criminal activity that 
targets a significant number of victims, perpetrated by either an individual or small group of individuals. This 
does not preclude the offenders being part of a large scale structured criminal enterprise. 
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sentencing. The second opportunity is periodic or asynchronous crime or impact surveys 
carried out by governments and businesses. Of these the former is possibly the most 
important data capture source to get right as it will inevitably form a primary source while 
the information gathered by the latter process is often tempered by the lens of societal 
attitudes at the time the survey is conducted. 
Key points of contact for information collection 
Victims and offenders interact with the investigative and legislative system from the first 
moment a crime is reported. These interactions provide ideal opportunities to gather 
information regarding the involvement of technology and therefore are able to classify it as 
a cybercrime. This approach of, little but often, enables a mass of information to be collated 
as the criminal justice system process progresses, rather than in an asynchronous survey 
approach. In order to map the key points of contact where information could be collected 
on both the offender and the victim a basic model of the investigative and prosecution 
process in the UK has been provided in Figure 3. 
Entry into the System 
A key point of data collection is where both the offender and the victim enter the system. 
During the workshop discussion it was highlighted that simply collecting an offender or 
victims email address(es) would greatly aid in the investigative process of the specific case 
and also provide intelligence  for correlation activities where fake or fraudulent digital 
identifies are used in investigations of digital locations such as bulletin boards. For the 
suspect key data could be gathered during the initial interview or if the suspect is ultimately 
arrested during questioning by the custody desk officer. Victims arguably provide a richer 
primary source of information regarding the crime they are a victim of. From the data 
collected at this point hypothesis can be tested through statistical techniques. For instance, 
recording the age at offence will allow the hypothesis cybercriminals begin offending as a 
juvenile or the mean age of conviction for females is the same as that for males to be tested.  
Prosecution and Pre-trial Services 
During the development of the case by the state prosecution service, decisions are made as 
to which crime to charge the offender with (if there are numerous possibilities) based on 
criteria such as the strength of the evidence in respect of the offence and the maximum 
punishment that each offence can yield. The result is to provide the strongest possible 
prosecution case which would result in the maximum penalty. These decisions may mask 
the involvement of a digital, technological component to the case which may not surface in 
later information regarding the prosecution. As a result these key decisions need to be 
recorded and made available so that they can be analysed in order to answer questions such 
as whether cybercrimes are not being prosecuted because of the complexity of the case and 
therefore prosecutors are reticent to proceed. Multi-level modelling, which expresses how 
the response variable depends on, or is explained by the explanatory variables, can be 
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conducted on information gathered here. The outcome of judicial proceedings can be 
assessed taking into account several hierarchical levels: offender, offence type, court, 
county. From this analysis we can see the effect of these hierarchical levels on the 
prosecution of cybercrimes.   
It was also pointed out during the workshop that as part of the development of the case to 
present to court, the prosecution will also seek external legal opinion with regard to the 
digital nature of the crime. The information provided by the third party then informs the 
prosecution services decision to proceed. This action should be captured if a decision 
capturing process as described above were to be implemented. However, it does provide 
the possibility for another source of survey data, approaching respected third parties who 
prepare such opinions and requesting a release of data regarding the number of requests 
and key data points regarding the opinion. 
Adjudication 
The adjudication process naturally provides information on the outcome of the prosecution 
such as acquittal. However, as Figure 3 demonstrates there are a number of other key 
decisions regarding where a trial is required to take place and also why that decision was 
made. A key decision as to whether a magistrates’ court undertakes the trial could be the 
involvement of digital technology in the commission of the crime. 
Sentencing and Sanctions 
As highlighted in the previous section, there exists the possibility that the use of digital 
technology in the commission of a crime may impact on the sentencing of the convicted 
criminal. In such cases, it would be beneficial to understand the role in sentencing that 
digital technology played in mediating, either as aggravating or reducing factors, the 
decision, and also the justification for such decisions. Such information could form the basis 
for revising sentencing guidelines which are currently limited in their scope with regard to 
guidance on the impact that technology has an aggravating of reducing factor. In addition, 
the collection of sentencing information such as conviction dates will enable the 
implementation of advanced statistical analysis including survival analysis (also known as 
event history analysis). Such statistics will test the hypothesis cybercriminals do not desist 
from offending. 
Corrections 
While not necessarily an active data point collection, it does provide an ideal point for 
offender surveys in order to understand motivations and techniques. Further, although 
sentencing provides data on how long a criminal is intended to stay imprisoned, the prison 
system provisions for early release of prisoners via, amnesty, commutation of sentence or 
parole. Information regarding these outcomes completes the picture of the cybercriminal 
lifecycle and may provide further insights into the evolution of the cybercriminal, for 
example in terms of reoffending rates. 
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Figure 3: The criminal justice process 
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What is the basic information that should be collected 
Considering the existing data collection points recognized above the workshop identified 
the basic information to be collected.  Table 1 indicates the collection points at which the 
identified information can be collected. The table also declares which category the data 
comes under (i.e. demographic, socio-demographic, criminal history, attitude, and 
motivation), and an indicator to whether the information can be collected on offenders and 
victims.  
All aspects of the criminal justice system provide rich sources of information that can be 
used to understand cybercriminal activities. However, it is important to realise that the 
purpose of the system is to bring offenders to justice not to generate information for 
statistical research. Therefore, any undertaking the criminal justice system makes in 
collecting data must have minimal impact on the personnel collecting the data otherwise it 
will be seen as an additional burden that may lead to inaccurate or incomplete data being 
collected. It is also vital to realise that the type of information that enables the classification 
and understanding of cybercrimes is sparsely distributed over several potential collection 
mechanisms and therefore new approaches must be adopted in order to provide a 
complete picture. However, it is not known whether cybercrime is substantial enough to 
warrant the expenditure it would take to implement such data collection, correlation and 
aggregation capabilities within the criminal justice system without appropriate evidence, 
creating a chicken and egg paradox. This paradox may be remediated via the use of reliable 
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Table 1: Basic data collection points 
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Adapting Existing Surveys and Research 
While the criminal justice systems adapts its data collection processes to act as a primary 
information source on cybercriminal activity, alternative data sources need to be identified 
to help bridge the void in the currently available data. As highlighted previously many of the 
key companies operating in the cyber security sector provide reports that detail their 
findings on numerous aspects of cyber security from breaches to financial impact. However, 
care must be taken in the consumption of such data as it is not always reported in a way to 
further the agenda of the reporting agent. There is also typically a slant toward a business 
audience in order to engage the business community with the issues surrounding the 
economic impact of cyber security on business prosperity. This leaves data sets that are 
produced in the public interest, such as the Crime Survey for England and Wales, Action 
Fraud (who for computer dependent crimes and online fraud distinguishes between online 
and offline crimes), or academic research data sets. In the 2010/11 crime in England and 
Wales report, the UK national statistician highlighted that cybercrime information “was not 
covered well by main statistics or alternative sources.” Information sources such as the 
CSEW and Action Fraud will be vital going forward as a first stage in gathering reliable data 
on cybercrime. However the question still remains as to what information would be useful 
to collect in such a survey. 
Surveys present a platform from which offenders can express their feelings, attitudes, 
motives and actions without fear of judicial repercussions. This method of data collection 
also allows victims the opportunity to talk about crimes committed against them away from 
the pressures of law enforcement; victims may not feel it appropriate to report to the police 
or do not wish clients to know they have fallen victim to cybercrime. The following pieces of 
information are a number of examples of the data that could be theoretically gained from 
surveys (on offenders and victims) to help us understand the reasons behind cybercrime:  
Offender 
• Whether the think they have committed a cybercrime 
• Their attitude to law enforcement  
• Who they believe their biggest threat is in relation to their criminal acts 
• Do they self-protect, i.e. put up barriers to prevent themselves being caught 
• How the criminal act was conducted 
• How they become involved 
• Motivation to commit the act 
Victim 
• Did they think they were at risk of a cyber attack 
• Do they feel they should protect themselves on the internet 
• Use of the internet 
• Brands and equipment used in daily life 
20 | Developing Cybercrime Research 
 
• How they knew they were victim of cybercrime 
Self-report studies can help to obtain information unknown to authorities. This mode of 
collection is extremely important when building a picture of crime as it provides information 
which would not necessarily have been obtained through official statistics.  
Universities also present a fundamental source of data. They have the ability to undertake 
research on a more tightly focused area in order to investigate particular aspects of 
cybercriminal activity2. Whereas national bodies such as the office for National Statistics has 
to be more focused on obtaining information on broader activities and trends. The 
combination of these bodies provides an ideal platform to undertake research to 
understand cybercriminal activities at multiple levels. However, it would be prudent to 
ensure that such research activities are considered as part of a high level research strategy 
that is prioritised to help deliver answers to the pertinent questions around cybercrime. 
Advanced data collection: Where do we need to be? 
Following on from the workshops discussion on existing data collection points, the delegates 
deliberated how the basic mechanisms of data collection could be extended to more 
advanced and nuanced data collection techniques. Three principal collection methods 
emerged: development of cyber specials, online forums and technologists. The 
development of ‘cyber specials’ who would be trained in both interview and cyber 
technology would help to bridge the technology gap between law enforcers and offenders. 
Their training would give them the knowledge to understand offenders actions and in some 
cases victim technology which may have resulted in them falling target to cybercrime. Such 
information would help us to understand the methods used in these criminal acts and 
provide policy with the necessary information to implement preventative methods. 
Previously we discussed the current collection points (Figure 3) at which data can be 
collected, considering these points it would be most beneficial for cyber specials to help in 
the collection of data on entry into the system. Their training in interviews and cyber 
technology will give them the knowledge to interview offenders on entry into the system, 
collecting information on the technology used, methods implemented, self-protection 
methods, how they became involved, detection, motivation and intention.  
Online forums was the second principal to emerge in which law enforcement, government 
agents, and researchers can talk to cyber offenders and potential cyber criminals to build a 
wealth of information. Research of cybercriminals using online forums has already begun; 
Holt, 2010; Holt et al., 2008; Holt et al., 2012. Data such as crimes committed, techniques 
used, intentions and motivations could be collected along with their demographic and socio-
demographic information. Collecting this array of information would facilitate the statistical 
analysis to establish significant factors related to offenders. On discussion of data collection 
                                                     
2 Naturally universities may also undertake broad based data collection activities. 
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within online forums it was felt that trust between collectors and offenders may limit data 
assembly, therefore significant knowledge, research and effort will be required to gain the 
trust of the online forum. Furthermore, it was deemed necessary that those who would 
enter the online forums would need to be skilled enough (e.g. cyber specials) to understand 
the technological methods discussed and norms of the cyber world. 
Technologists were seen as the third principal collection method. Their knowledge would 
enable them to decipher if the equipment has been used for their original intentions or for 
criminal actions. It is seen that the technologists would in some instances be able to 
remotely identify if equipment is being ill-used and also investigate held equipment. 
Information on the equipment being used to carry out these attacks and their procedures 
will aid preventative methods and detection. Correlations can then be made between the 
equipment used and type of cybercrime.  
Summary 
To increase both the quantity and quality of our data we must both utilise existing data 
collection points whilst developing further advanced techniques to capture those untouched 
areas of information. It became apparent in the workshop discussion that basic information 
still needed to be collected in which current collection points could be exploited. The 
criminal justice process provides an abundance of contact points to which basic information 
can be collected. Five stages of the process exist: entry into the system, prosecution and 
pre-trial services, adjudication, sentencing and sanctions, and corrections. Exploiting each 
collection point will aid the development of the investigative and enforcement process 
whilst benefiting the analysis of cybercrime. In addition to the criminal justice process 
existing survey and research provide alternative data sources. Surveys present a platform 
from which information can be collected that is quite often missed within the criminal 
justice process such as, feelings, attitudes, motives and actions. Furthermore, three 
advanced collection methods were identified: cyber specials who would be trained in both 
interview and cyber technology, online forums to gather more personal data and 
technologists who would have the ability to ascertain how equipment has been used – for 
better or for worse.  
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Cyber Criminals and Victims 
A recurring theme throughout the workshop is the need for 
collaborative work in this space. It was felt that in order to effectively 
research such a new and unique area, collaboration between 
government, industry and academics is needed. Whilst the 
government provides high level research, the time and resources 
available to them are limited; collaborating with academics will 
enable the expansion of time and resources. In addition, academics 
will provide the trust needed for direct communication with offenders 
to gather extensive information.  
Two fundamental areas were identified in the workshop as requiring extensive research:  
• Analysis of cyber criminals  
• Investigation of victim profiles  
This section discusses the proposed research on both cybercriminals and their victims. 
Developing an understanding of who criminals and victims are in terms of their 
characteristics in addition to existing data sources could help to prevent future crime, 
deliver appropriate interventions and safeguard the public. Research on cybercrime data is 
minimal in comparison to the extensive analysis of traditional crime, the critical reason 
being the limitations of existing data (discussed in ‘Cybercrime Data’). Research and its 
subsequent results are restricted to the quality of its data therefore advancements in 
cybercrime data must first be made.  
Analysis of cyber criminals 
Research into why individuals commit crime when others do not, and to ascertain how 
these individuals are different to law abiding citizens is carried out worldwide. Within the 
workshop research into the profile and reasons of cyber criminality were discussed 
theoretically at length with numerous questions raised; 
Do cyber offenders have common demographic characteristics, for example, are they a 
particular age? Do only males commit cyber offences? Where do cyber criminals live, rural, 
urban? Do they reside in the same country? Do those who specialise in a particular form of 
cybercrime live in a specific area? Or is it that these individuals have similar attitudes, for 
instance, not believing they have committed a crime or oppose the law? Or do these 
attackers have similar motives or a similar skill set. 
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Answering the above questions and comparing the characteristics of online to offline 
offenders will help to establish whether these groups of offenders are different. The results 
of such analysis could help in the detection, intervention and punishment of such criminals. 
As already noted cybercrime is a unique crime, requiring a new set of skills not previously 
needed in traditional crime.  
Criminal career research, which is fundamental to criminological study, will enhance our 
evidence base on cybercrime. 
“The construct of a ‘criminal career’ is a powerful approach for accumulating rich 
knowledge about offenders and using that knowledge for developing rational policies 
for dealing with crime… The basic thrust of criminal career research is to look at the 
characteristics of individual offenders and to use that information for dealing with a 
particular individual, but also to look at aggregates of offenders and their collective 
characteristics for guidance on how criminal justice policies can best respond to their 
offending patterns.” (MacLeod et al. 2012). 
Following the formation of longitudinal data on cyber criminals, which is a key component 
of criminal career research, we can begin to make inference on cyber offenders’ criminal 
careers. Such research considers the impact of age or stage of career, on factors that 
influence criminal behaviour and attempts to explain motivations for starting, continuing 
and stopping offending. Several features of an offenders’ criminal career can be studied; 
onset, duration, frequency, seriousness, escalation, desistance, prevalence, specialisation 
and recidivism (see Farrington, 1992; MacLeod et al. 2012; Soothill et al., 2009). 
Examining just a few features of an offender’s career can provide a wealth of knowledge, to 
illustrate; onset examines the start of an individual’s criminal career, for instance, 
establishing the age at which someone begins offending, or the entry offence into their 
criminal career. Frequency looks at the occurrence of offences, such as, the number of 
cybercrimes reported, prosecuted and convicted. Specialisation investigates how far 
offenders focus on certain types of offending, for example, do cyber criminals commit only 
cyber offences, which can be extended to whether they commit only one type of cyber 
offence or multiple (i.e. phishing, fraud, espionage). Moreover, prevalence looks at the 
proportion of the population who are committing offences, for instance the proportion of 
cyber criminals in the UK. 
Whilst the results will provide valuable information, measuring the varying features of a 
criminal career is extremely difficult laying host to a number of limitations, the principal 
being the samples true representation. The quality of the data and the information stored 
(discussed in ‘Cybercrime Data) restricts the analysis and area of the criminal career which 
can be researched. For instance, official data only reveals a limited number of the total 
amount of crimes committed. This is due to not all crimes being reported, not all reported 
crimes being recorded and not all offenders being apprehended. Furthermore, results 
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obtained through the analysis of official crime data will measure the criminal process and 
changes within this process along with criminal activity (Francis et al. 2004). 
Investigating victim profiles 
The second fundamental research area identified in the workshop is the investigation of 
victim profiles, in which delegates identified three key questions: 
• Are victims of cybercrime a specific group of people? 
• Are there reasons why these individuals are becoming victims of cybercrime? 
• Does the victim base change by type of cybercrime? 
Establishing whether victims of cybercrime are a specific group of people will help to target 
preventative methods and resources. The government aims to make the public more aware 
of the harm caused by cybercrime and the preventative steps which can be taken to help 
safeguard from such attacks. For example, the website www.getsafeonline.org has been 
published providing informative information to stay safe online. 
Through a victim information database (discussed in ‘Cybercrime Data’) researchers can 
investigate the characteristics of the victims to develop our understanding of who they are 
and determine if specific groups of people are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks and the 
reasons why. The first step is to identify and explore the demographics (i.e. age, gender, 
location), socio-demographics (i.e. education, employment, income), attitudes (i.e. to 
cybercrime, risk, self-protection) and technological characteristics (i.e. technology skill set, 
technology used, day to day technology brands, internet) of the victims to build a complete 
profile.  
Following this information the common characteristics of the victims can be identified. For 
example, it may become apparent that the majority of victims were of the age 25 to 30, if 
this was the case preventative methods could be targeted to this age group such as 
educating them on how to stay safe online. Or, it may be the case that the majority of 
victims were found to be in full time employment and earning over £50,000 or were start-up 
companies with less than 50 employees. In each case preventative methods need to be, in 
part, targeted to the victims found most at risk. With improvements to data collection 
statistical analysis can be performed to establish which characteristics of cybercrime victims 
are statistically significant. Researching the reasons why these characteristics have left 
people vulnerable to cyber-attacks will aid the development of preventative methods and 
evidence base on cybercrime. 
The term cybercrime encompasses a multitude of offences, of which require different skill 
sets and knowledge (i.e. phishing, skimming, espionage). The offenders themselves may be 
fuelled by the same or very different motives and intentions depending on the type of cyber 
offence. Are the victims therefore the same or different dependent on the type of 
cybercrime? The motives and intentions of one cybercriminal to the next when committing 
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the same type of crime may be quite different but there may be some similarities in the 
victims they target, which therefore need to be investigated. Can the characteristics of a 
person or business be predictive of the attacks they are at risk of encountering? 
Summary 
Analysis of both cybercriminals and their victims will develop our understanding of 
cybercrime and aid preventative measures to tackle cybercriminal activity. The analysis of 
cybercriminals needs to expand on current research, looking in depth at their characteristics 
and criminal patterns whilst comparing the findings to traditional offenders. Following the 
production of longitudinal data on cybercriminals, the advancement of cybercrime research 
will be further amplified by the introduction of criminal career research; enhancing our 
evidence base.  
In understanding cybercrime we do not have to stop at offender research, analysis into 
victim profiles will also provide valuable information and widen the evidence base. 
Establishing the reasons why some individuals become victim to cybercrime when others do 
not will aid the development of preventative methods to combat cybercrime. Extensive and 
innovative research is needed to further the fight against such crime.  
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Conclusion  
The workshop and our research highlighted the difficulty with regard 
to identifying statistical information for computer enabled crime, 
unlike computer dependent crime which has a reasonably robust set 
of criteria for assessment as embodied by legislation such as the 
Computer Misuse Act. Computer enabled crime embodies the 
transformation of conventional crime (covered by current legislation) 
by digital technology. 
 This poses a significant issue for data collectors and the legislature in where to draw the 
line. This report has attempted to define new approaches that may help in this regard 
through the focus on the impact of the technology in such cases via an assessment against 
metrics such as force multiplier and entry barrier. However, this discussion leads to the 
intriguing possibility of an alternative to developing new legislation to handle computer 
enabled crime. Instead new sentencing guidelines could be developed for existing criminal 
offences where technology is seen as an aggravating or reducing factor in the 
commissioning of the crime. This provides the court service greater flexibility in sentencing, 
but also enables the courts to remain dynamic enough to keep up to date with the evolving 
use of technology in the commission of crimes. 
Although currently the form of cybercrime data is patchy at best, the full depth of its wealth 
has not yet been explored with the potential to provide some very valuable and intriguing 
information. This exploration should take place before the development of new data begins 
to depict any potentially rich information which can be built on or incorporated. In addition, 
knowing the limitations of existing data will aid the development of future data sources. The 
data source taxonomy proposed will provide researchers with the tools to classify and 
evaluate the quality of existing data for their research restricting the risk of unaccounted 
bias. To move forward in this space it was debated theoretically that the production and 
provision of a standardised data frame was needed to develop reliable and valid datasets 
whilst facilitating optimal sample sizes and comparable datasets. Following the 
development in quantity and quality of publically available data advancements in statistical 
analysis can be made. Through the use of statistical techniques factors associated to 
cybercriminals can be identified along with recurring themes found within victims. Such 
information can be used in addition to current research to not only help in the detection of 
cyber criminals but also target resources and preventative measures. 
While this report has focused on the types of data that could be collected and how this 
could be achieved, what it has not discussed is why this has not already been achieved. In 
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2004 the chairman UK all Party Internet Group, Derek Wyatt, highlighted the need to obtain 
pertinent information on the extent of the cybercrime problem. In 2007 David Wall 
summarised the state of play with regards to the available data in that there were 
“encouraging signs” as US and UK national crime and justice surveys were including 
questions on cybercrime victimisation. However, the results published by industry need to 
be scrutinised in order to avoid the potentially self-fulfilling fear, uncertainty and doubt 
markets model for security products. Wall also highlighted a serious lack of information on 
offenders and their motivation, accompanied with a significant amount of victim under-
reporting. In 2011 the UK government set up its strategy to promote the UK as the best 
place in the world to conduct digital business. This included the following objective: 
“By the end of 2011, build a single reporting system for citizens and small businesses to 
report cybercrime so that action can be taken and law enforcement agencies can establish 
the extent of cybercrime (including how it affects individuals and the economy).” 
During the discussion at the workshop with the key stakeholders, it became clear that 
gathering detailed information on cybercrime statistics has begun to move on (i.e. Action 
Fraud) but is still in need of significant advancement. Arguably the government’s goal of 
becoming the number one cyber secure business location cannot be validated without 
appropriate evidence. In nine years our empirical knowledge of offending and victimisations 
has only just begun to develop. So why has the will not be translated into action? What are 
the inhibitors here? And yet despite a lack of knowledge the criminal justice system has not 
collapsed. This indicates to the authors’ two potential results: 
1. That the criminal justice system has adapted and self-organised to accommodate 
these digital activities within its existing processes and statues, or, 
2. Criminal activity is going undetected and unprosecuted. 
It is not clear to us which is the case. What is clear however, further research is required 
before we can begin to answer these questions.  
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